Information security incidents are increasing both in number and in scope. In consequence, the General Data Protection Regulation and the Directive on security of network and information systems force organisations to report such incidents to a supervision authority. Due to the growing of both the importance of managing incidents and the tendency to outsourcing, this study focuses on IT-consulting firms and highlights their vulnerable position as subcontractors. This study thereby addresses the lack of empirical research on incident management and contributes valuable insights in IT-consulting firms' experiences with information security incident management. Evidence from interviews and a survey with experts at IT-consulting firms focuses on challenges in managing information security incidents. The analyses identify and clarify both new and known challenges, such as how the recent regulations affect the role of an IT-consulting firm and how the absence of major incidents influences stakeholder awareness. Improvements of IT-consulting firm's incident management process need to address internal and external communication, the information security awareness of employees and customers and the adequacy of the cost focus.
INTRODUCTION
Information and communication technology has recently gained vital importance for organisations. However, the benefits of technology use are accompanied by the risk of becoming a target of attacks on information security (InfoSec). This risk is increasing due to the higher value and sensitivity of information that organisations process (Ab Rahman and Choo, 2015; Hove et al., 2014; Tøndel et al., 2014) . Here, an incident refers to an unexpected or unwanted event that has a significant probability of threatening the security of information. For the concerned organisation, such an incident can pose several negative consequences, including economic loss, lost productivity, legal consequences, impaired image and weakened customer trust (Ahmad et al., 2012) . Due to the heightened occurrence of incidents, a structured InfoSec incident management (ISIM) has developed, which encompasses incident management, awareness training, mitigation of vulnerabilities and preparation activities (Ab Rahman & Choo, 2015; Cusick and Ma, 2010) . The development of ISIM has generated several standards and guidelines which provide assistance for the ISIM of organisations but are often too general to be easily implementable (Bailey et al., 2007) . In addition, the recently implemented General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which has been the most significant development in data protection in the past 20 years, created immense uncertainty among organisations regarding how to fulfil the requirements (O'Brien, 2016) . The increased duty to report incidents to a supervision agency has prompted major issues, such as delays of more than five days and up to a month (MSB, 2017) .
Research has rarely examined or described how organisations have implemented ISIM (Line, 2013) . Thus, there is a need for specific and adapted guidance for organisations and encouragement of further empirical research on ISIM in practice. The outsourcing of IT-related services has become normal in business today, and subcontractors are more vulnerable to cyber attacks because they have access to different customer data (EU, 2016b) . Nevertheless, there is a substantial lack of studies on ISIM at such organisations (Hove et al., 2014) . This study aims to fill this knowledge gap and address the challenges that IT consulting firms (with over 20 employees) encounter in the context of ISIM. Hence, the study results contribute to the development of ISIM within other organisations and informs the development of future theory. To investigate the ISIM of IT consulting firms, this study pursues the following research question: What challenges do IT consulting firms experience with regard to ISIM, new legal requirements and their specific position?
After this introduction, Chapter 2 delineates the ISIM framework for this study. After the methods section, the results that were obtained from Swedish IT consulting firms highlight several challenges that are associated with ISIM. After the discussion of theoretical and practical implications, the conclusion summarises the study and suggests further research.
INFORMATION SECURITY INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

Standards and Framework
Many institutions have produced guidelines that are based on international standards for ISIM, such as ISO/IEC 27035:2016 and NIST SP 800-61 (Rev 2) (hereinafter referred to as ISO and NIST, respectively) (MSB, 2012; Tøndel et al., 2014) . ISO presents general concepts of ISIM and a structured, five-phase process for handling incidents and improvements of ISIM. Organisations of any kind can apply this standard because the principles it provides are generic (ISO, 2016) . Although ISO is not a complete guide, proper implementation can reduce the negative consequences of an incident for an organisation. Meanwhile, NIST assists organisations with effectively structuring ISIM. The content is generic in regard to platforms, operation systems, protocols and applications (Cichonski et al., 2012) . Similar to ISO, NIST describes an ISIM process, which NIST has condensed into four phases and a sub-cycle to manage secondary incidents that emerge from an initial incident. This study applies a four-phase framework that derives from the mentioned standards (see Figure 1 ). The four phases are (1) planning and preparation, (2) detection and reporting, (3) response and analysis and (4) learning and improvement. In addition, the centrum subsumes general issues that relate to the entire ISIM process.
(1) The planning and preparation phase targets the creation of capacity to manage incidents when they arise. This phase ensures that InfoSec policies are up to date at all organisational levels and that a comprehensive ISIM policy and reliable incident response team (IRT) exist. Such proceeding implies not only that persons responsible for ISIM must be involved and trained but also that all employees must gain proper knowledge about correct behaviour. Moreover, positive internal and external relations are similarly essential for a refined ISIM in terms of dedicating appropriate organisational and technical resources to responsible teams. The hardening of systems, applications and networks in advance can minimise the attack surface of an organisation. In this context, further tools warrant consideration, such as alternative communication tools and facilities, hardware or software, documentation of systems and applied rules that are necessary for incident analysis, and software to mitigate incidents (Cichonski et al., 2012) . Finally, the established ISIM process requires proper testing to ensure its functionality.
(2) The detection and reporting phase focuses on activities during an incident, which include detecting, identifying the character and scope and estimating consequences of an incident. Although the routines that the first phase prepares can support a rapid response when the incident is of a known type, the detection of an incident among the large number of warnings that a monitoring system produces requires experience and expert knowledge within organisations (Cichonski et al., 2012) . This phase does not classify events but rather manually and automatically collects information about system vulnerabilities, events and decisions regarding measurements. Such information must be comprehensible and of a quality that enables analyses during subsequent phases. Apart from such recording of evidence, events that can affect InfoSec need adequate reporting to responsible stakeholders to inform further decision-making (ISO, 2016) .
(3) The response and analysis phase entails measurements to both understand the character of an incident, including the cause and consequences, and respond quickly to reduce the extent of the problem. Both parts of this phase are intertwined and alternate until the incident is successfully treated. Properly defined policies and processes can establish an General Issues appropriate base of information for decision-making about mitigation measurements. The analysis is founded on the information that was collected in the previous phase. Thereby, it classifies the incident and suggests measurements for response. Response implements these measurements and accumulates further information regarding the success of the treatment, which provides additional input for another analysis. A comprehensive documentation of analyses, decisions and measurements is advisable, for example to meet legal requirements, record evidence and learn from both successes and failures. In addition, predefined procedures should guide each responsible person in an organisation in acting properly during the information assessment, incident classification and mitigation. Such guidelines should include up-to-date information about the notification of other stakeholders, resource allocation, required documentation, treatment and notification of completion. (ISO, 2016) (4) The learning and improvement phase develops ISIM within an organisation, which includes all personnel to some extent. Attention should be directed to lessons that are learned after each large incident and regularly after small incidents and events (Cichonski et al., 2012) . Discussions involve acquired knowledge of how and when the incident emerged, which lacks of knowledge and guidance appeared and which measurements may help to prevent the system from further occurrence of similar incidents. Comprehensive documentation of the incident management provides the basis for future improvement of ISIM. This phase completes the documentation with information on the performance of organisational learning and on improvement activities regarding ISIM, which can also facilitate improvements to this phase and inter-organisational collaboration during ISIM (ISO, 2016).
Legal Regulations
The GDPR, which has applied within the European Union (EU) since 2018-05-25 (EU, 2016b), addresses the protection of individual data and information and the privacy of individuals. The GDPR aims to synchronise the requirements for data protection and privacy within the EU and to adapt former laws to the demands of a more digitalised society. The regulation concerns the citizenship of an individual rather than the location of the data storage (Tankard, 2016) . Important changes regard the following: establishing data portability, assessing consequences of data breaches, reporting incidents regarding personal data within 72 hours and appointing a data protection officer. Moreover, organisations can encounter costly penalties if they do not fully meet the requirements. In particular, an incident report to a national data protection agency must contain information on the character, extent and consequences of the incident as well as the measures that have been performed to reduce negative effects. (EU, 2016b) The European Parliament has passed another regulation, namely the directive on security of network and information systems (NIS), which came into force on 2018-05-10 (EU, 2016a). The NIS applies to operators of digital services and other critical infrastructure, such as energy and water supplies, transportation, finance and health services. The directive aims to improve the security level of information systems and networks within the EU. In accordance with the NIS, providers are now responsible for preventing and managing incidents in information systems and networks, contending with risks and reporting incidents to a specific agency. Concerned organisations must implement a systematic and risk-based ISIM. Deviations from the stated requirements can be subject to sanctions, but the amount of such a penalty would depend on the extent of the deviation. In particular, the NIS forces providers to report incidents that have a significant impact on the continuity of critical infrastructure or digital services without any unnecessary delay. This reporting involves even incidents at a subcontractor, such as an IT consulting firm. Such a report must comprehensively announce the character, extent and consequences of the incident as well as the enacted measures to mitigate a further spread and improve ISIM. (EU, 2016a) 3 METHODICAL PROCEEDING
Case Selection
The initial literature review assisted with framing the investigation and theoretical background for both the interview study and the survey (Bryman and Bell, 2015) . This study applied a mixed methods approach in which the survey results broadened and complemented the evidence that resulted from the interview study. This methodical approach yielded a deeper understanding of the ISIM of IT consulting firms. For this purpose, this study selected three IT consulting companies for data collection: one parent company and two subsidiaries from a business group that consists, apart from this parent company, of 70 subsidiaries in several European countries, including Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Germany. The subsidiaries employ 30 individuals on average. Besides the parent company, this study examined one subsidiary of this size and one that is four times larger, which ensured proper variation in the case selection. According to Denscombe (2014) , a smallscale study requires at least five interviews and 30 survey respondents to appear appropriate. In view of this, the present study collected data from six toplevel experts in the field of ISIM as well as 47 respondents with varying experience. Based on the collected data, the investigation achieves an adequate depth of understanding, which it extends with a broader comprehension of the particular position of IT consulting firms. Table 1 presents the participants and their affiliations. 
Data Collection
Information about the ISIM of IT consulting firms is sensitive; therefore, this study employed interviews as a main part of the mixed methods approach. Six individual interviews were held with experts in the field of InfoSec who were employed by three companies. Each interview lasted between 40 and 70 minutes and was recorded and transcribed with permission to facilitate subsequent analyses (Denscombe, 2014) . The majority of the semistructured interviews were conducted personally at each interviewee's ordinary place of work to ensure that no external factors would influence the individual's perceptions. The point of departure for interviews was the theoretical framework of this study, which is based on standards and regulations in the context of ISIM. Open-ended questions were prepared in advance to consistently guide interviews and allow interviewees to discuss and explain particular issues if they appeared to be relevant to the study (Johannesson and Perjons, 2014) . Through this proceeding, this study collected evidence that clarifies the topic and addresses the research question. Although the results of the interview analyses are of primary importance, this study also included a survey to broaden its knowledge base.
The survey complemented the interview study and extended perceptions of interviewees to gain a comprehensive view of the degree to which employees who are not InfoSec experts are conversant with the ISIM of their company. Since previous research has considered answering closed questions to be easy and practicable for respondents (Denscombe, 2014) , the survey applied six closed questions. Two questions consisted of two subquestions, while one contained four. Of these 11 questions, three were binary, i.e. Yes or No, four extended the binary choice with an indicator for ignorance or irrelevance, i.e. N/A, and the remaining four applied a Likert scale that spanned from one to six. By omitting the neutral response option, the study forced respondents to opt for one direction (Croasmun and Ostrom, 2011) , which heightened the clarity of the results.
As in the interview study, the survey departed from the theoretical framework. For stronger validity, the survey included two questions that were almost identical to determine whether participants responded similarly to both. The survey originated electronically, and participant A1 distributed a link to 80 individuals who are employed by CA. To obtain an appropriate number of responses, this study surveyed the IT consulting company with the largest number of employees of the three companies, and it thereby excluded the employees of CB and CC. After two weeks, the survey obtained a satisfactory number of 47 responses, which constitutes a sound response rate of 58.75%.
Data Analysis
Recordings, transcripts and experiences during interview situations were the basis for analysis in the interview study. This analysis sought to clarify the content (Schutt, 2015) and thereby nuance understandings of how IT consulting firms navigate ISIM. Departing from the framework and questionnaire, the analysis arranged the evidence from interviews in accordance with the four phases of ISIM and further addressed general issues. To strengthen the validity of this study, interviewees received an opportunity to review the results of the analysis and provide further considerations. Therefore, the results emphasise challenges that IT consulting firms encounter in ISIM and the recent restrictions of regulations.
The survey yielded ordinal and nominal data, which this study presents as the mode of each dataset. Despite limitations to the mathematical treatment of a mode, this study employs mode for its resistance to outliers and ability to demonstrate important information about the population under investigation. By this representation, the analysis of the survey results reveals the experience and knowledge of employees in regard to selected aspects of ISIM. A bar chart visualises the quantitative results of the survey questions that applied a Likert scale.
CHALLENGES IN INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
Interview Results
Planning and Preparation Phase
The participants in the interview study discussed challenges that relate to the ISIM phase planning and preparation (see summary in Table 2 ). Two participants reported difficulties with integrating planning and preparation activities into daily business, particularly in dedicating a full-time person to InfoSec. They remarked that people who work with these issues must function within several roles, which leads to postponements. Both respondents acknowledged challenges in prioritising InfoSec, especially regarding the focus on costs and chargeable hours within IT consulting firms.
The majority of interviewees stated that GDPR poses challenges because it can accompany a larger number of incidents. In particular, C1, A3 and B1 stressed the requirement of incident reporting within 72 hours. C1 conceded that the company had no routine at the time to meet this requirement. One reason that C1 reported was that only two individuals had extensive knowledge of ISIM; thus, their absence due to holidays would cause timerelated problems. Meanwhile, B1 discussed the fear of misjudging the severity of an incident. Specifically, a misjudged incident that later appears to be more severe than initially perceived could pose penalties for the company. B3 explained that costs are an obstacle to the 72-hour requirement. Given the example of Christmas holidays, B3 argued that a firm could weigh the costs for extra wages against the risk that an incident occurs. A3 noted that the actual time that is available to an IT consulting firm is significantly less than 72 hours, as an IT consulting firm needs to inform its customers first.
Another challenge, as A3 reported, is the maintenance of databases of personal data, which improve test results on customers' IT systems. Both partners, i.e. an IT consulting firm and a customer, must become aware of new regulations and that such data may no longer be shared among partners. A2 expressed difficulties with comprehending GDPR, which could lead to variation in understandings and implementations regarding, for example, the degree of severity of an incident that would oblige a company to report. In view of the risk of severe penalties, A1 and C1 acknowledged the importance of adapting service contracts to ensure that the responsibility for GDPR remains with the customer.
Many participants reported a lack of routines for ISIM. A particularly problematic aspect is that existing processes must be adapted to GDPR, implemented before the regulatory deadlines and finally obeyed by poorly informed employees. Therefore, C1 identified training on incident reporting as imperative for implementing such adapted routines. Although A2 and B2 recognised benefits of practicing ISIM in advance, they also considered its preparation and execution to be challenging because of high resource restrictions.
Budget restrictions are a reoccurring issue in the ISIM of IT consulting firms. The participants reported that they experience higher security needs from customers, yet they struggle to convince customers to pay for work on customer InfoSec. Most often, insights arise late, and they have to extend the contract post hoc because of the extra time that such additional task will require. The participants emphasised this as a critical challenge because an incident for a customer within the system that an IT consulting firm has developed and implemented also has negative effects on the firm's reputation. 
Detection and Reporting Phase
Several issues that relate to the ISIM phase detection and reporting emerged during the interviews. Table  3 represents the identified challenges. All participants stated that the major issue in this phase is the uncertainty among employees regarding the characteristics of an incident and which aspects must be reported. A1 observed a large variation in which information is reported and explained that employees sometimes report less important events that cannot be classified as an incident by any means, whereas serious incidents not always are reported. Such lack of recording constitutes an issue since the event will nevertheless emerge, e.g. orally, and will then be hard to analyse. A3 viewed a major problem in the companies' routines. Employees tend to contact A3 instead to self-report an incident, which forces A3 to prepare the record; otherwise, learning or following up later becomes impossible. A3 imagined that this behaviour was due more to a lack of awareness of proper execution of reporting among employees than to inadequate knowledge of procedures. In contrast, A2 stated that employees are solution-oriented; however, improper overconfidence could result in an insecure ISIM.
In the context of GDPR, A2, B1 and C1 stated that they expect further obstacles in detecting and reporting incidents due to extended legal requirements and new types of incidents that may arise. C1 mentioned two issues, overreporting because of the fear of making mistakes and underreporting because incidents are not detected. Apart from determining whether an incident has occurred, insufficient clarity of policies renders employees uncertain where to report it if such incident concerns a customer, according to B1. In contrast, B2 stated that the parent company provides clear policies which declare that all incidents must be reported centrally and that no local intermediaries exist. If employees have questions, they should contact their consulting managers, such as B1. B2 claimed that employee training is neglected since B2 is no longer responsible for the firm's security.
C1 shared that the parent company is working to reduce the embarrassment that employees may feel when they report an incident, as these feelings can promote undesirable behaviour that can yield serious consequences. C1 emphasised that anyone can encounter an incident. Since CA does not have any opportunity for system monitoring, as A3 stated, the parent company is further responsible for network scanning and analyses. Therefore, A3 demanded better detection activities from the central level.
Moreover, A1 stressed the difficulty and importance of developing a reporting process that is easy to perform but still includes all relevant aspects. Otherwise, employees would not employ it. In addition to A1, A3 and B1 acknowledged that their existing reporting processes have a common bottleneck: only one person has access to reported incidents, which can become a severe issue if such person is not working. • Embarrassing to report incidents A3
• Insufficient system scanning from central level A1
• Lack of an easy and adequate process for incident reporting A1, A3, B1
• Bottleneck in the process for incident reporting
Analysis and Response Phase
In regard to the ISIM phase analysis and response, participants emphasised the obstacles in Table 4 . Although CA has routines in place, A1 perceived two challenging issues: to be solely responsible for the escalation of an incident to the right stakeholder and to gauge the extent to which the daily business must be adapted. A1 reported that CA never had to deal with an incident that affected a customer but feared the gauging would be even harder, which A2 also considered. The matter of concern is the balance between tightening security and continuing the daily business; in this regard, even A3 noted a possible difficulty. With documentation and policies, A2 and A3 spotted insufficiency in prioritising, escalation and response, and they suggested clarification of how a responsible person must act, particularly in response to different types of incidents. A3 found it essential that these policies are also available, known and practiced within CA. In addition to enhanced policies, CA trained another individual to decide on technical issues during incidents to reduce the risk that only one single person is capable of performing such a crucial task, according to A1, A2 and A3.
In contrast to CA, CB does not perform any analysis or response to incidents; according to B2, this is instead managed by the parent company. Although CB detects and reports an incident to the central level, B2 criticised the fact that no feedback returns, so CB consequently does not know how and when CC handles such incident. B2 suggested an intermediate at CB to heighten attention and ensure fast response to particularly meet the time requirements of GDPR. In this regard, B2 blamed the general focus on costs for the absence of such an intermediator thus far. B1 identified a lack of policies and processes for handling reported incidents. In addition, B1 demanded a more thorough documentation of incidents and mitigation activities. B2 perceived a stronger security thinking and focus on solving incidents quickly and comprehensively if a customer is affected, whereas this is rather disregarded in the own business.
C1 declared that CC is responsible for analysis of and response to all incidents that happen at subsidiaries in Sweden. In addition to the subsidiaries' manually reported incidents, CC monitors the entire system of the business group. The group is large in size and thus constantly attacked, so CC filters irrelevant ones from the permanently arising incident warnings. However, C1 perceived a potential threat in the inadequacy of knowledge and experience, which may lead to inappropriate decisions when an incident arises, especially if substitutes are responsible for the initial assessment. 
Learning and Improvement Phase
The fourth phase of ISIM concerns learning about incidents and improvement of ISIM. The interviewees reported particular problems which prompt the challenges in Table 5 . A1 and A2 acknowledged that CA has established a cross-functional group that discusses mostly larger incidents during regular meetings. The participants therefore emphasised the learning opportunities that can stem from occasional events or smaller incidents, particularly with regard to avoiding larger incidents that easily can result from the former. Despite these meetings, A1 noted the challenge of allocating time for individual, in-depth learning, which could also encourage an enhanced feedback flow from the meetings to all employees. In addition, A3 perceived opportunities to learn from reoccurring patterns in attacks on the network, but such opportunities are precluded by insufficient feedback on incidents from the parent company.
According to B1, proper communication and knowledge sharing about incidents with other organisations would be a significant learning opportunity. According to B2, CB does not conduct any meetings to solely discuss incidents; rather, this issue is only one point on the agenda.
In contrast, C1 stated that CC maintains a proper process for the regular assessment of both small and large incidents. However, C1 claimed that the major issue is to decide how much of the information that is discussed at assessment meetings should be provided to employees. Since the sheer volume of information can prompt employees to completely stop reading such information, C1 perceived a challenge in how much and which kind of information to provide. Another issue that C1 acknowledged is the apparent ease of documenting external knowledge, such as incidents and mitigation activities, compared to preserving the internal experience of a human expert in the field. 
General Issues
In regard to the question of which issues participants experienced that apply to ISIM phases, several considerations emerged that substantiate the challenges in Table 6 . All participants emphasised that high awareness among employees is significant for both InfoSec in general and internal policies and processes in particular. Because of the business focus of IT consulting, all employees possess sufficient knowledge of technology and InfoSec. Although all new personnel undergo InfoSec training, the majority of participants noted that it would be desirable for all employees to regularly repeat the content. According to B2, obtaining a high security level requires that such content is up to date and employees receive regular reminders; otherwise, there is the risk that InfoSec issues fall behind the core business focus. A3 and C1 noted that even though employees have knowledge of InfoSec, many attacks are advanced and well performed, which makes an intrusion hard to detect, even for experts. Classified customer data provide another issue that is associated with employee awareness and training. Particularly, if an escalation of a detected incident must target the right stakeholder, then the initial classification of such incident requires adequate knowledge, according to C1. A3 claimed that CA's employees have low maturity in terms of open networks at public places. Despite a discussion of risks, employees do not recognise them, as A3 noted, particularly when using mobile devices. A3 acknowledged that employees understand the value of information, such as sensitive information that employees share via e-mail, on a computer but not on a mobile phone. Although CA sends e-mails in a secure manner, it cannot ensure that customers also do this, which renders it impossible for an employee to properly delete sensitive e-mail. A2 mentioned that mobile devices are generally more insecure than computers.
Another risk emerged from the interviews: for the benefit of a strong focus on customer demands, IT consulting firms may neglect internal demands. According to A1, it is easy to disregard work on internal security, partly to avoid costs but mainly out of eagerness to assist customers with their problems. A1 explained that the implementation of GDPR has recently accelerated this issue to ensure their own compliance with GDPR in addition to the compliance of their customers. B1 reported that this tendency towards enhanced awareness of customer demands also extends to incidents. A2 shared that since customer systems are often more critical, CA seeks higher accuracy in their assessment than in assessments of their own systems. Such imbalance is completely normal according to A2, as such assessment produces further business opportunities for an IT consulting firm. However, most participants remarked that the will to fulfil customer demands has even led to advancements of intern InfoSec. Customers who require a high security standard enforce IT consulting firms to devote effort to security management of both internal and customer systems. Participant A3 claimed that IT consulting firms unfortunately focus on intern InfoSec management first if it becomes inevitable rather than not seldom first when an incident occurs. As A2 concluded, 'it seems that we have much more to do in the field of IT security, but it is hard to know exactly what before something has happen'.
Three of the participants considered a focus on chargeable hours at IT consulting firms. A1 explained that since InfoSec management is a continuous task, it sometimes seems difficult to prioritise it in daily work, particularly when InfoSec is not the core business. A3 added that IT consulting firms prioritise tasks that generate profit, so InfoSec may receive lower priority. B2 added that security is easily forgotten and rarely prioritised by CB for time-and cost-related reasons. According to A3, employees never experienced a major incident in CB. Because of this lack of experience, employees cannot comprehend the importance of thorough reporting.
Both participants at CB experienced a lack of communication with the parent company regarding particular aspects. For example, in reference to the GDPR, B1 found it unclear whether CC would provide common policies or if each subsidiary is responsible for creating their own. B2 expressed dissatisfaction because CB does not know how CC handles the reported incidents. • Excessively strong customer focus that neglects internal demands A1, A3, B2
• Focus on chargeable hours hampers the implementation of a continuous work on InfoSec A2, A3 • Lack of (experience with) major incidents B1, B2
• Insufficient communication with parent company
Survey Results
The survey compiled evidence from 47 employees at CA. Almost three out of four respondents (74%) categorised their knowledge on InfoSec as insufficient, whereas only slightly more than a third of the employees (26%) perceived it to be appropriate. Figure 2 visualises the perceived level of knowledge of several issues in the context of ISIM. The respondents selected their particular level of knowledge according to a scale that ranged from (1) very limited to (6) deep knowledge.
Employees expressed stronger confidence in their knowledge of incident avoidance than of incident detection, reporting requirements and company policies. The results indicate that 13% of respondents selected an answer to Q1 from the lower half of levels (1-3); in comparison, this figure was 31%, 34% and 39% for Q2, Q3 and Q4, respectively.
When asked if recent changes in regulations, namely GDPR and NIS, would affect the judgement of the necessity to file an incident report, 11% expected a more difficult assessment, 42% anticipated no effects and the remaining 47% did not know.
Regarding incident reporting, the majority of respondents had knowledge of how and to whom to report an incident. Even though 94% of respondents knew how to act in accordance with internal ways of reporting, this level of knowledge fell to 70% in regard to incidents that affect a customer. However, 89% of the respondents knew where information on their company's ISIM was stored, while only 11% did not know. Reporting an incident can be challenging, particularly if an employee or a colleague has caused the incident. To the question of whether a respondent would hesitate to report an incident that she or he has caused, 9% answered 'Yes'. The difficulty of reporting under such circumstances may illustrate answers to the followup question of whether a respondent would prefer an anonym: 21% answered Yes, 66% selected Irrelevant and 13% said No. 
DISCUSSION
This study evidences that ISIM poses challenges for IT consulting firms, whose various issues impact both their own business and that of their customers. Among these issues, certain challenges warrant particular attention in this study of three Swedish consulting firms:
(1) A strong cost focus (2) Uncertainty among employees due to lack of knowledge of the nature and management of an incident (3) Inter-organisational collaboration (4) Trust in technical solutions (5) Inadequate documentation and knowledge management (6) Insufficient understanding of and adaption to legal requirements First, InfoSec competes with other profitproducing activities, which results in a low priority of InfoSec prior to an incident. This study thereby reinforces the findings of Werlinger et al. (2009) , who have reported that organisations tend to diminish the priority of InfoSec in response to costs. Although the interviews emphasise the establishment of training opportunities for improving ISIM, such training requires preparation and time for execution, which may be deferred because of costs. Bartnes et al. (2016) have also reported such low priority of training from their research on ISIM in the electricity sector. The consequences of such cost focus are apparent in the example of company B, which lacks documentation, processes and routines as well as personnel and computer support for ISIM because of costs to implement a proper ISIM. Another consequence of the cost focus is that IT consulting firms value the InfoSec of customer systems more than that of the internal systems. This imbalance stems from efforts to maintain valuable relations with customers and a sober image as an enabler of future business. However, enhanced awareness of InfoSec towards customers results in stronger requirements, which forces IT consulting firms to improve their competence in InfoSec management.
Second, all participants in this study reported some kind of uncertainty with regard to the nature and management of an incident. Detecting and understanding that an incident is happening appeared likewise to be a challenge, as it involved knowing when and which information an employee must report, to whom it must be reported, and which measures to subsequently follow. Such uncertainty implies that policies and training opportunities are lacking, insufficient or not properly shared within the organisation (Hove et al., 2014; Line, 2013) . This study further evidences that employees have a tendency to underestimate small incidents (Ahmad et al., 2012; Bartnes et al., 2016) . However, such events should be used to analyse how to avoid the advancement of a small-to-large incident. Since the companies in this study admitted that large incidents have not yet occurred, their lack of experience can explain their ignorance of the importance of such analysis for organisational learning. Another reason for underestimation could be the focus on costs that implies that IT consulting firms do not spend much effort on small events. Moreover, the participants highlighted the difficulty of transferring implicit knowledge from ISIM experts into the organisation. A solution could be the simultaneous involvement of experts and novices in the ISIM process to learn in praxis from each other (Werlinger et al., 2009 ) and to avoid knowledge loss when an expert leave the organisation.
Third, the IT consulting firms in this study claimed that inter-organisational collaboration is not a substantial issue in their businesses. Nevertheless, in terms of managing an incident, the evidence conveys that deciding to shut down a customer system in response to a severe incident is a seemingly uncomfortable situation. Although all participants emphasised the utmost priority of security, they also acknowledged the benefit of maintaining as much service as possible. From this discrepancy stems an ambiguity that complicates the decision of appropriate measures and the communication of the necessary activities to a customer. Flaws in such communication can affect the external view of a company and, thereby, its future business opportunities. It therefore appears essential to establish reliable customer relations. The standards for ISIM further suggest the use of such inter-organisational relations for the exchange of knowledge and experiences. This study could not identify such trustful relations in practice, which only one participant viewed as a problem. However, a deeper inter-organisational knowledge exchange could strengthen customer relations and improve the ISIM for both partners.
Fourth, in contrast with previous research (Werlinger et al., 2009; Werlinger et al., 2010) , this study could not confirm the argument that warnings that IT monitoring systems generate are difficult to handle because of their number and different characters. A reason is that the parent company solely maintains the monitoring of the entire system and further purchases a service to filter the generated warnings. In addition, the parent company performs minimal system scanning, which thus produces fewer warnings. Nevertheless, future challenges can emerge from this trust in technical solutions. For instance, an incident that remains undetected for a longer period of time can pose massive consequences. In addition, this study indicates that the subsidiaries have little knowledge of the particular results of the system monitoring. Improvements to communication and knowledge sharing within organisations regarding benefits and limitations of technical solutions could enhance employee awareness of ISIM. As the interviews highlight, experts with technical knowledge are rare in the subsidiaries. Moreover, their knowledge is not well documented, which can elevate to a challenge in situations that require particular technical experience (Werlinger et al., 2008) .
Fifth, the lack of proper documentation is a prolonged hindrance to adequate knowledge management and sharing both within and between organisations. Even if standards and previous research continuously emphasise the importance of proper incident documentation, this study reveals that this aspect constitutes a major challenge to IT consulting firms throughout the ISIM process. This issue includes insufficient knowledge about the following subjects:  Ways of reporting (Hove et al., 2014)  Responsible persons within the organisation and the customers  Which aspects to document  The importance of recording  Handling a major incident (Jaatun et al., 2008)  Ways of analysing and responding to an incident  Policies, processes and guidelines  Means of communication and feedback
The lack of documentation and knowledge cultivates uncertainty among employees. Improvements should address the mentioned knowledge gap to advance employee awareness of appropriate behaviour and mitigation measures. Such organisational learning must even involve learning from failure and wrong decisions; therefore, a proper documentation of both causes and consequences is an essential precondition for continuous organisational learning. Moreover, such documentation must contain adequate content and be accessible for all personnel with respect to the determined security levels, which in turn demands previous consideration of employee security levels. This study reveals that future training efforts should particularly address the secure usage of mobile devices and public networks. In addition, according to the interviews, meetings for discussing small incidents and extraordinary events could enhance employee compliance, awareness and competence.
Finally, advances in regulations introduce another challenge to IT consulting firms. The requirements of GDPR and NIS provoke uncertainty among persons who are responsible for InfoSec. Since these regulations are open to interpretation, policies, guidelines and service-level agreements must adapt to new and future changes in legal requirements. The results evidence that responsible persons at IT consulting firms are extensively informed of GDPR and the possibly costly consequences of insufficient compliance, which may account for the recent high priority of this issue. Experts in the field of InfoSec anticipate that GDPR impacts the detection and reporting of incidents to a larger extent than employees of IT consulting firms. Moreover, this study indicates that organisations currently focus solely on GDPR; this one-sided orientation implies that the requirements of the NIS risk becoming irrelevant. For IT consulting firms, cost focus may be an influencing factor of this orientation, as GDPR entails costly penalties while the NIS does not.
CONCLUSIONS
This study addresses the gap in empirical research on IT consulting firms' management of InfoSec incidents. In particular, it has examined challenges that organisations perceive with respect to their specific position as a subcontractor. The evidence from interviews and a survey of InfoSec experts and employees at IT consulting firms has highlighted obstacles in the context of ISIM as discussed in detail throughout this paper. These concerns include communication issues, the cost focus of companies, the lack of experience with large incidents, weak awareness of InfoSec and inadequate comprehension of documentation, policies, processes and guidelines. Moreover, the recently implemented regulations, namely GDPR and NIS, pose further challenges for IT consulting firms, such as the correct interpretation of regulations, the fulfilment of requirements for timely reporting and the adaptation of service-level agreements and policies to demands.
By demonstrating these challenges, this study contributes to future developments in the ISIM field in both theory and practice. Since no prior research has focused specifically on GDPR or IT consulting firms, the results constitute a novel contribution to the body of knowledge in the InfoSec management field. To substantiate the findings of this study, further research must address the classification of challenges for organisations in general. Therefore, future research could extend the data collection to a larger number of participants, companies and branches for comparison. However, the enhanced understanding of the position and challenges of IT consulting firms with regard to ISIM provide valuable insight for companies that want to improve their internal and inter-organisational ISIM.
